I. Introduction This presentation addresses the taxation and financial accounting treatment of environmental remediation liabilities(costs) as promulgated by: Technical Advice Memorandum(TAM) 9315004, Revenue Ruling 94-38, TAM 9627002, The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 121, Accounting For The Impairment Of Long-Live Assets And For Long-Lived Assets To Be Disposed Of, The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Statement of Position(SOP)96-1, Environmental Remediation Liabilities, and The Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin(SAB) No. 92, Accounting And Disclosures Relating To Loss Contingencies. II. Taxation Treatment The tax issue of predominant concern is whether these environmental remediation costs result in a current income tax deduction under Internal Revenue Code section (§)162, or whether these costs are capital expenditures, as defined in §263, and for which a depreciation deduction may be allowed under §167. A related issue is whether (§)162(f) precludes the deduction of fines and penalties levied in connection with the environmental protection and remediation processes.
§ 162 generally allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Even though a taxpayer may incur an expense only once in the business' life, the expense may qualify as ordinary and necessary if it is appropriate and helpful in carrying on the business, is commonly and frequently incurred in the type of business conducted by the taxpayer, and is not a capital expenditure. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111(1933). Treasury Regulation (Treas. Reg.) 1.162-4 provides that the cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinary efficient operating condition, may be deducted as an expense. However, repairs in the nature of replacements, to the extent, that they arrest deterioration and appreciably prolong the life of property, shall either be capitalized and depreciated in accordance with § 167 or charged against the depreciation reserve if such account is kept. § 162 has, also, been applied to allow business expense deductions for the costs of removing and disposing of waste materials produced in the taxpayer's business. See H.G. Fenton Material Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 584 (1980). § 263 generally precludes deductions for capital expenditures. § 263 (a)(1) provides that no deduction shall be allowed for any amounts paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property. § 263(a)(2) provides that no deduction shall be allowed for any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance has been made in the form of a deduction for depreciation, amortization, or depletion. Treas. Reg. 1.263(a)-1(b) provides that capital expenditures include amounts paid or incurred: (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life of property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property to a new or different use. Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs and maintenance of property are not capital expenditures. Treas. Reg. 1.263(a)-2(a) provides that capital expenditures include the cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of machinery, buildings, and equipment, furniture and fixtures and similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year. § 263A provides that the direct costs and indirect costs properly allocable to real or tangible personal property produced by the taxpayer shall be capitalized. § 263A(g)(1) provides that for purposes § 263A, the term "produced" includes construct, build, install, manufacture, develop, or improve. § 167 generally allows as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear( including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) of property used in a trade or business, or of property held for the production of income. Through provisions such as § 162(a), § 263(a) and related code sections, the Service generally endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are properly attributable, resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes. In Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111(1933) and Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), the Supreme Court has specifically recognized, the "decisive distinctions[between capital and ordinary expenditures] are those of degree and not of kind." Thus in determining whether capitalization or current deduction is the appropriate tax treatment for any expenditure, it is imperative to consider the extent to which the expenditure will produce significant future benefits. See INDOPCO, Inc. V. Commissioner,112 S.Ct. at 1044-45 In April 1993, The Service addressed this overriding issue in the form of Technical Advice Memorandum(TAM) 9315004. While a TAM is in effect a private ruling, issued by the Service's national office, on a completed or past transaction relating to a particular taxpayer, it does, however, provide a basis for analysis and discussion of the issue-- in this situation, determination of whether environmental remediation expenses are "capital" expenditures or "ordinary and necessary" expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business. The taxpayer in TAM 9315004 had used a lubricant containing PCBs several years before their hazards were known. The taxpayer had not broken any laws and had converted to other lubricants when the perils of PCBs were detected. Thereafter, the EPA ordered the taxpayer to cure the contaminated sites. This TAM addressed the treatment of the taxpayer's costs in complying with the EPA order:
In rejecting the taxpayer's position that the remediation operations were repairs, the Service concludes that these activities, taken as a whole, resulted in improvements to the taxpayer's properties. The purported improvements included curing polluted land and making it more marketable, avoiding further penalties by bringing the properties into compliance and providing a safer environment for employees and owners of neighboring properties. This conclusion, however, disregards the fact that the remediation actives restored the site to its uncontaminated state. The Service relied on earlier cases in which the taxpayer had chosen to forgo annual maintenance, which later resulted in the need for vast curative activities, was required to capitalized these expenditures. For instance, in Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. 1 (1979), the taxpayer was required to capitalize the cost of dredging ditches to clear a farm irrigation system of sediment because the expenditures were more than merely incidental; they made the property more efficient, productive and valuable. The TAM did not address the issue to which underlying asset the remediation expenditures should be capitalized. With the exception of the contamination of buildings, e.g., lead paint or asbestos, most pollution affects land, which is not depreciable under §167. On June 2, 1994, the Service issued Revenue Ruling (Rev. Rul.) 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. At issue was whether the costs to clean up land and to treat groundwater, that the taxpayer polluted with hazardous waste from its business, are deductible as a business expense under § 162 or must be capitalized under § 263. The taxpayer purchased land in 1970; this land was not contaminated at the time of its acquisition. The taxpayer subsequently constructed a manufacturing plant on this property which the taxpayer continues to own and operate. The manufacturing operations discharge hazardous waste, and in the past, the taxpayer buried this waste on portions of its land. In 1993, in order to comply with presently applicable and reasonably anticipated federal, state, and local environmental requirements, the taxpayer decided to remediate the soil and groundwater that had been polluted by the hazardous waste, and to establish an appropriate system for the continued monitoring of the groundwater to ensure that the remediation had removed all hazardous waste. Accordingly, the taxpayer began excavating the contaminated soil, transporting it to appropriate disposal facilities, and backfilling the excavated areas with uncontaminated soil. These soil remediation activities started in 1993 and were targeted to be completed in 1995. The taxpayer also began constructing groundwater treatment facilities which included wells, pipes, and other equipment to extract, treat, and monitor contaminated groundwater. Construction of the groundwater facilities began in 1993, and the facilities will remain in operation on the taxpayer's land until 2005. During this time, the taxpayer will continue to monitor the groundwater to ensue that the soil remediation and groundwater treatment eliminate the waste to the extent necessary to bring the taxpayer's land into compliance with the environmental requirements. The effect of the soil remediation and ground water treatment will restore the taxpayer's land to essentially the same physical condition that existed prior to the contamination. During and after the remediation and treatment, the taxpayer will continue to use the land and operate the plant in the same manner as it did prior to the cleanup except that the taxpayer will dispose of any hazardous waste in compliance with environmental requirements. The Service held that since the groundwater treatment facilities constructed have a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year of construction, the construction costs are capital expenditures under § 263(a) and Treas. Reg. 1.263(a)-2(a). The Service further stated that since construction of these facilities constitutes "production" within the meaning of § 263(A)(g)(1), the taxpayer is required to capitalize, under § 263A, the direct costs and a proper share of allocable indirect costs of constructing the facilities. The costs of the groundwater treatment facilities are recoverable under § 168, Accelerated Cost Recovery System. The Service further opined that the soil remediation costs and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures, other than the expenditures to construct the groundwater treatment facilities, do not produce permanent improvements to the taxpayer's land within the scope of § 263(a)(1) or otherwise provide significant future benefits. In this situation, the Service concluded that the appropriate test for determining whether expenditures increase the value of property is to compare the status of the asset after the expenditures with the status of that asset before the condition arose that necessitated the expenditures (e.g., before the land was contaminated by the taxpayer's hazardous waste). The taxpayer's remediation and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures did not constitute improvements, because the taxpayer merely restored its soil and groundwater to their approximate condition before they were contaminated by the taxpayer's manufacturing operations. Furthermore, since the soil remediation and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures represent ordinary and necessary expenses (these are helpful in carrying on the taxpayer's business and are commonly and frequently required in the taxpayer's business), the costs to evaluate and remediate the soil and groundwater, exclusive of the costs to construct the groundwater treatment facilities, are deductible under § 162. In 1996, the Service issued TAM 9627002. This TAM holds that costs paid to investigate the extent of environmental contamination, including legal and consulting fees, are currently deductible under § 162. To recap, if the remediation costs do not increase the property's value and if the expenditures are: helpful in carrying on the taxpayer's business, and are commonly and frequently incurred in the taxpayer's type of business, the remediation costs are deductible under § 162. If the property's value, after the remediation expenditures are incurred, exceeds the property's value before the condition that triggered the remediation, then the remediation is deemed to have enhanced the property's value. Consequently, the expenditures are to be capitalized under § 263.
A secondary issue is the tax treatment of fines and penalties levied in conjunction with the environmental protection and remediation processes. For instance, the EPA, under CERCLA, can impose a $25,000 per day penalty on a respondent who fails to perform the response action contained in the EPA's unilateral administrative order. Additionally, the EPA may recover up to four times its costs in damages and penalties( actual costs plus treble damages). Another example is the nonconformance penalty manufacturers of heavy-duty vehicles and engines pay to the EPA, as prescribed by the Clean Air Act. This nonconformance penalty is paid to obtain the necessary certificates of conformity for vehicles and engines which exceed the set emission standard but which do not exceed the upper limit associated with that standard. If a vehicle or engine is introduced into commerce or sold without the certificates of conformity, the manufacturer is subject to a penalty of not more than $10,000 per each violation of the Act. § 162(f) provides: no deduction shall be allowed under § 162(a), Trade or Business Expenses, for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law. Treas. Reg. 1.162-21(B) defines a fine or similar penalty to include an amount:
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(2) provides: "Compensatory damages (including damages under section 4A of the Clayton Act) paid to a government do not constitute a fine or penalty". However, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c)(2) example 7 reasons that taxpayers who are fined for violating pollution control laws can not deduct such fines. To properly assess the appropriate treatment of the "fine or penalty", the very nature of the assessment must be scrutinized. In Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76, the issue was the whether the nonconformance penalty(NCP) assessed by the EPA under section 206(g)(1) of the Clean Air Act(Act) was a nondeductible "fine or similar penalty" for purposes of § 162(f). The Service held that the NCP was not a "fine or similar penalty" for purposes of § 162(f); therefore, § 162(f) did not preclude deducting the NCP as a business expense under § 162(a). The Service based it ruling on the fact that the Act and the legislative history indicate that the NCP is primarily designed as a permissive and equalizing formula to eliminate the competitive economic advantage that a nonconforming producer might otherwise have over a conforming producer. The legislative history of the NCP shows that it is not punitive in nature. Rather, payment of the NCP provides one of two lawful alternative ways for receiving a certificate of conformity. The other way is simply to conform to the established emission standard. Mere nonconformity within the allowable range of nonconformity is not a violation of the act if there is a payment of the NCP. In Colt Industries, Inc., Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant v. The United States, Defendant-Appellee, 880 F.2d 1311 (CA-FC, 1989), affirming the Claims Court, 11 ClsCt 140 (1986), Crucible, Inc., an affiliated subsidiary of Colt Industries, Inc., failed to eliminate violations of the federal Clean Air Act and the federal Clean Water Act (Acts) by statutory mandated dates. The EPA pursued an injunction and civil penalties as prescribed by the Acts. In 1979, The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania signed the consent degree, and entered judgment on the complaint that the Department of Justice had filed in accord with EPA's recommendation. In satisfaction of the civil penalties, Crucible remitted checks totaling $1.6 million to the Pennsylvania Clean Air and Clean Water Funds. Colt claimed these payments as ordinary business expense deductions on its 1979 consolidated tax return. After audit of Colt's returns, the Service disallowed the deductions on the basis that these payments constituted fines or similar penalties under § 162(f). Colt paid the deficiency assessed by the Service, together with interest. When the Service denied its claim for refund, Colt filed the refund suit with the Claims Court. Colt's position was based on two augments:
The first augment was unacceptable to the appellate court because, as a necessary predicate according to Colt, the court would have to "determine the purpose or purposes served by the specific penalty at issue in order to ascertain whether the payment is barred from deduction." The Appellate court also stated that neither § 162(f) nor the related Treasury Regulations prescribe a "purpose" inquiry. Therefore, it was beyond the court's mandate to embark on one to make its own assessment of the deductibility of a particular penalty. With respect to the second augment, Colt could not demonstrate how the penalties, which in its view were designed to return Crucible to the financial position in which it would have been had Crucible complied with those laws, compensate the government. In any event, the appellate court stated the EPA is not authorize under either Act to seek compensatory damages. It is limited to injunctive relief and the maximum monetary penalties prescribed by the Acts. In True v. U.S., 90-1 USTC ¶ 50,062 (10th Cir. 1990) rev'g 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985) the district court had allowed a deduction for the penalty imposed for oil spills pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act(Act). The district court noted that the penalty had a "remedial purpose", because it was placed in a revolving fund used to clean up oil spills, and that it was imposed on the basis of strict liability. The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that Congress intended to incorporate the judicial view that some strict liability penalties are nondeductible. The circuit court reasoned that, because a wholly independent provision of the Act authorized the Government to recoup costs incurred in oil cleanup operations, which appeared to be the primary compensation or remedial mechanism in the Act, the penalty section served as an additional sanction to deter and punish, not to compensate or remedy. In S& B Restaurant, Inc. v. Comr., 73 T.C. 1226 (1980) the court concluded that payments made under a settlement allowing the taxpayer to continue to discharge sewage until it could link up with a planned sanitary sewer system were deductible. The reason was the settlement agreement constituted a "permit" to continue discharging the sewage. The court noted that the applicable statute, the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, had punitive and remedial aspects. However, the court found four factors indicating that the taxpayer's payments were deductible: (1) the taxpayer was obligated to connect to the sanitary system when it was ready; (2) settlement payments were equivalent to the amount the taxpayer would pay when it connected with the system; (3) the taxpayer was not permitted to build its own treatment system; and (4) the taxpayer's discharges were not environmentally harmful. III. Financial Accounting Treatment The financial accounting issues associated with the environmental remediation processes are: (1) whether the asset has been impaired, and thus, whether a loss should be recognized; (2) when should the remediation liabilities be recognized; (3) how should the remediation liabilities be measured:[(i) what costs to include in the remediation liability; (ii) how future events are to be treated; (iii) how to account for the division of costs among Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs); (iv) how to account for potential recoveries; and (v) whether remediation liabilities can be discounted.]; and (4) how environmental remediation liabilities and recoveries should be reported on the financial statements.
In 1995 The Financial Accounting Standards Board(FASB) issued FASB No. 121, Accounting For The Impairment of Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of. This pronouncement is effective for financial statements for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1995. This Statement establishes accounting standards for the impairment of long-lived assets to be disposed of and for long-lived assets to be held and used. Basically, FASB No. 121 provides that long- lived assets for sale should be reported at the lower of the carrying value or the fair value less the costs to sell. Essentially, this requires the entity to record the losses, if any, on the disposal of fixed assets as soon as the entity becomes committed to sell the assets. For long-lived assets held for use, the valuation process consists of essentially three steps:
For example, a lessor determines that the building it is leasing contains asbestos and/or lead paint (a sign of impairment). The lessor would then have to compare the future, undiscounted cash flows (rental revenues less related operating expenses) to the building's carrying amount (acquisition or construction costs plus improvements less accumulated depreciation). If these future cash flows are projected to be less than the building's carrying value and the building's carrying amount exceeds the building's fair value, an impairment loss (the excess of the building's carrying value over the building's fair value) would be reported as a component of income from operations.
Once the entity has determined that it is probable that an environmental liability has been incurred, the entity should estimate that liability based on available information. The liability's estimation should include the entity's: (1) allocable share of the liability for a specific site, and (2) share of amounts related to the site that will not be paid by other PRPs or the government. This measurement process involves the following issues:
FASB No. 76, Extinguishment of Debt, defines risk-free monetary assets as: (a)
Direct obligations of the U.S. government;
These issues are addressed in the context of : (1) balance sheet and (2) the income statement. (1) Balance sheet display. An entity's balance sheet may include: (a) receivables from other PRPs that are not providing initial funding; (b) anticipated recoveries from insurers; and (c) anticipated recoveries from prior owners as a result of indemnification agreements. As discussed above, these recoveries are recognizable when the recoveries' realization is probable. However, FASB Interpretation No. 39, Offsetting of Amounts Related to Certain Contracts, addresses the issue of offsetting environmental liabilities and related recoveries in the balance sheet. This pronouncement states that offsetting is inappropriate except when a right of offset exists. A right of offset exists when all of the following conditions are met: (a) Each of two parties owes the other determinable amounts. (b) The reporting party has the right to setoff the amounts it owes to the other party with the amounts the other party owes it. (c) The reporting party intends to setoff. (d) The right of setoff is enforceable by law. (2) Income statement display. Recording an environmental liability usually results in a corresponding charge to income. Further, since events underlying the incurrence of the obligation relate to an entity's operations, remediation costs should be charged against operations. In income statements that classify items as operating or nonoperating, the remediation-related expenses should be reported as a component of operating income. Credits arising from recoveries of environmental losses from other parties should be reflected in the same income statement line. Any earnings on assets that are reflected on the entity's financial statements and are earmarked for funding its environmental liabilities should be reported as investment income. FASB Emerging Issues Task Force(EITF) Issues 90-8, Capitalization of Costs to Treat Environmental Contamination, and 89-13, Accounting for the Cost of Asbestos Removal, describe certain circumstances in which these remediation costs should be capitalized instead of charging income. These circumstances are: EITF Issue 89-13. Costs incurred to treat asbestos should be capitalized when:
(a) the costs are incurred within a reasonable time period after a property
with a known asbestos problem is acquired, or EITF Issue 90-8. Environmental contamination treatment costs may be capitalization if recoverable but only if any one of the following criteria is met:
(a) The costs extend the life, increase the capacity, or improve the
safety or efficiency of property owned by the entity. For purposes of
this criterion, the condition of that property after the costs are incurred
must be improved as compared with the condition of that property when
originally constructed or acquired, if later.
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